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ABSTRACT
This article explores the relationships among neoliberalism, social policy
expansion and authoritarian politics in contemporary China. It argues that in
the era of neoliberalism, rising new right and authoritarian governments, the
Chinese Communist Party has sought to retain power by shifting politically
to the right and promoting neoliberal-looking economic policies. These poli-
cies have raised average living standards but also increased insecurity for
most of the Chinese population, while new social policies have facilitated
marketization. Social policy expansion includes minimal cash transfers as
well as social old-age and health insurance for hitherto excluded sections
of the population. These policies have begun to erode long-standing urban–
rural segregation, but they have added new, underfunded, social programmes
rather than widening participation in existing ones, re-segregating provision
so that urban elites and formal sector workers enjoy much more generous
provisions than many people working informally and those without work.
These social policies’ most significant dark sides thus include compounded
income inequalities and the segmentation and stigmatization of the poorest.
Authoritarian controls have enabled the Communist Party to avoid redistribu-
tive policies that would undermine its urban support, so that politics in China
differ from the right-wing populism of new, anti-establishment authoritarian
regimes.
INTRODUCTION
Other contributions to this Debate section explore relationships among neo-
liberalism, social policies, new right and authoritarian politics. They take as
their starting point arguments that expansions of social provisioning in the
period since the global spread of neoliberalism in the 1980s may sometimes
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facilitate neoliberal projects (Lavinas, 2013, 2017; Saad-Filho, 2015), and
that they increase insecurity, reinforce, reproduce and structure inequali-
ties, and facilitate social control, ordering and segregation (Fischer, 2018;
Posner, 2012). They ask how new, right-wing populism and authoritarian-
ism play into the relationships between neoliberalism and social policies
globally.
This article explores these issues in the People’s Republic of China
where, under continued authoritarian one-party politics, the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) has since the late 1980s orchestrated neoliberal-looking,
market-oriented economic reforms and expanded social policy provisions.
China is an important case because it is the world’s largest authoritar-
ian state and the world’s second largest economy. Its economic reforms
led to sustained high levels of growth — an average of 8.5 per cent per
year between 1980 and 2018 — during which time China has shifted
quickly from a low-income to an upper-middle income country, as defined
by the World Bank. The proportion of the population living in extreme
poverty (on less than US$ 1.90 per day, 2011 dollars at PPP) fell from
66 per cent in 1990 to 0.7 per cent in 2015, while the proportion below
the World Bank’s upper-middle income country poverty line of less than
US$ 5.50 per day fell from 98 per cent to 27 per cent.1 China is there-
fore sometimes portrayed as a model for other authoritarian or developing
countries.2
But can the term ‘neoliberalism’ be used in the Chinese context? Neoliber-
alism is usually associated with free market capitalism— increasing the role
of markets (reducing capital controls, deregulating credit and labour mar-
kets), privatizing public enterprises, signing free trade agreements, lowering
taxes and reducing government spending — as promoted in the 1980s and
1990s by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Evans
and Sewell, 2013; Ostry et al., 2016).3 China’s economic reforms from
around 1980, when it joined the World Bank and IMF, did encompass many
such measures. As China moved away from a Soviet-style state-planned
economy, it introduced markets for goods and services as well as labour and
housing, pursued state enterprise reform, privatized many public enterprises
and encouraged private businesses, reduced capital controls, and signed
more than a dozen free trade agreements. In 2001, it joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Since taxation was introduced in the 1980s, individ-
ual income taxes have been low, while corporate taxes and enterprise social
insurance contributions have been reduced in recent years. Although, in the
early 21st century, this rightward shift in policy provoked criticism from
1. World Bank data, available at https://data.worldbank.org/
2. For a discussion, see Breslin (2011).
3. Evans and Sewell distinguish economic policies from both neoliberal ideology and neolib-
eral economic theory, which, they say, ‘stresses the welfare maximizing consequences of
market exchange’ (2013: 36).
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China’s ‘New Left’ — largely due to rising income inequalities — which
tempered official pro-market rhetoric, in practice the Party-state4 has contin-
ued to see markets and the private sector as important drivers of economic
growth.
Yet, despite its dramatic, marketizing transformations, China is still far
from being a free market economy. The Chinese Party-state owns (holds a
majority of the shares in) large enterprises in key sectors, and state banks
still dominate and control much enterprise finance. Private businesses, mean-
while, have had an uneasy ride since they emerged in the 1980s, struggling
to shake off the ‘capitalist’ stigma of the Maoist, state-planning period and
win bank loans. In the early 21st century, the New Left pushback halted
privatization in some sectors, and led to greater support for state enterprises
(a process referred to as guo jin min tui— the state advances and the private
retreats). Most recently, under Xi Jinping, the CCP has been strengthening
its control in private as well as public companies. Internationally, the Party-
state also still regulates trade, as well as inward and outward investment.
For this reason, although neoliberalism even in the United States (usually
seen as a leading neoliberal example) has relied more on state power and
intervention than is usually understood (Kiely, 2018), the Chinese Party-
state’s significant role in a nascent market economy means that some would
question China’s neoliberal credentials while others see it as exhibiting an
unusual variant of neoliberalism (see Weber, 2018). David Harvey (2005:
120), for example, argues that ‘neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics’
best describes China’s ‘particular kind of market economy that increasingly
incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitatedwith authoritarian centralized
control’.
Most arguments in support of the notion that China is neoliberal go beyond
policies to dwell on the ideas, ideology or ‘social imaginary’ of neoliberalism
(Breslin, 2006; Evans and Sewell, 2013). Anthropologists in particular have
portrayed China as influenced by neoliberal ideas and ideology (Anagnost,
2004; Greenhalgh and Winckler, 2005; Kipnis, 2007; Rofel, 2007; Wang,
2004; Yan, 2003; Zhang and Bray, 2016). They have been challenged by
others who argue that while acceptance of neoliberal ideas is evident, par-
ticularly among urban elites, their dominance has been overstated given
the continued influence of Buddhism, Daoism and other traditions (Horesh
and Lim, 2017; Nonini, 2008). Yet most would agree that neoliberal ideas
find support among China’s urban elite, where the benefits of ‘market ef-
ficiency’ are virtually unquestioned (Nonini, 2008). Although most Chi-
nese would say that they share a collectivist ideology (and nationalism and
family values remain strong), there is now in fact a strong individualist
streak in urban society, and one that equates success with conspicuous con-
sumption and the usual status symbols — designer brands, large villas and
4. I use ‘Party-state’ in this article, rather than ‘state’ or ‘government’ because the Chinese
Communist Party penetrates and controls government and other state institutions.
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expensive cars. Entrepreneurship is valued, and successful entrepreneurs
(such as Jack Ma, former chairman of Alibaba) are national celebrities and
media personalities. The phrase ‘to get rich is glorious’, which has been
widely attributed to China’s former top leader, Deng Xiaoping, the architect
of its market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, still resonates today in a society
that celebrates personal wealth.
This article argues that social policies facilitated China’s particular brand
of neoliberal-looking market reform and contributed to increasing inse-
curities for many people. As economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s
introduced labour markets and dramatically increased the numbers (and
proportion) of the population in the informal sector, planned-economy sys-
tems of social protection and provision collapsed or were eroded (Duckett,
2011). The Chinese Party-state then used social policies to reduce dissatis-
faction with the downsides of marketization: the wave of high unemploy-
ment from state enterprises in the late 1990s and early 2000s, rapidly rising
income inequalities, and then the negative impact on farming from WTO
entry.
These new social policies undermined planned-economy systems of so-
cial segregation but they created new ones. Planning-era rural communes
were abolished, and urban work units — that had provided job security
and ‘cradle to grave’ social benefits — were gradually dismantled. The
household registration (hukou) system that had strictly segregated rural
and urban dwellers and defined their social provisioning, was eroded. This
urban–rural divide was then further weakened by extending social poli-
cies to migrant workers in the formal sector and, for the first time, creat-
ing entitlements to health insurance and pensions for rural dwellers. But
a new, means-tested social assistance programme, the ‘Minimum Liveli-
hood Guarantee’ (MLG), was implemented highly selectively and intru-
sively, and mostly only for the ‘deserving’ poor — those with disabilities
or unable to work. It has thus segregated the poorest into a stigmatized
underclass.
New social insurance programmes also segregated the population in novel
ways as well as compounding rising income inequalities. They extended
public provision of education, social old-age, health and unemployment in-
surance, but provided more generously for public servants and those with
formal labour contracts than for informal workers and those without work
in both cities and countryside. At the same time, education, health and
housing were commercialized, which pushed up prices and contributed to
labour market insecurities. Thus, although rapidly rising state revenues and
per capita GDP allowed the government to increase spending on social
policies, it disproportionately benefited the better-off.5 As a result of this
5. China’s GDP per capita rose from US$ 195 in 1980 to US$ 9,770 in 2018 in current US
dollars (figures from the World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org). While the World Bank
does not provide data for social spending in China, it reports that government spending on
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combination of marketizing economic reform and regressive social pol-
icy, China moved rapidly from being one of the most equal to one of the
most unequal societies in the world in the 20 years between 1990 and
2010.6
The extent to which social policies have facilitated social controls, be-
yond segregating the poorest with targeted social assistance and segmenting
provision at the formal/informal sector divide, is moot. Social insurance
programmes increasingly use new technologies to gather and share per-
sonal information in ways that might invade privacy and facilitate social
control. But the CCP already has at its disposal many coercive tools that
are not available in democratic political contexts: media controls, surveil-
lance technologies and police powers to prevent (for example, class-based
or feminist) societal challenges to its policies. Indeed, the Chinese Party-
state has been able to implement neoliberal-looking economic policies and
regressive social policies in part because of its authoritarian political insti-
tutions and already extensive mechanisms of social control. It has directed
media reporting of social problems and policy solutions — emphasizing
the universality of policies, for example, while downplaying the inequal-
ities in provision and uneven implementation. Thus, the CCP has been
able to articulate a Marxist, socialist ideology while espousing right-wing,
neoliberal-looking economic policies as well as fiscally conservative social
policies that disproportionately benefit — and co-opt — better-off urban
dwellers that are an important part of its 90 million membership and its
support base.
The rest of this essay provides evidence to support this argument. The
next section outlines the main transformations to social provisioning that
have resulted from the social policy reforms of the last 30 years in China.
It focuses on the achievements of these policies, the positive transfor-
mations in terms of universal entitlements, and the influences that have
shaped them. The following section then explores the dark side of these
policies: how they increase insecurities for some, compound rising in-
equalities, and facilitate social segmentation and control. The concluding
section discusses the politics behind China’s social policies, their relation-
ships with neoliberal, right-wing and authoritarian politics elsewhere, and
what this means for China as a model for authoritarian and developing
countries.
health rose between 2000 and 2016, when it was at a similar level to Russia and slightly
above India and Vietnam.
6. According to World Bank estimates, China’s Gini coefficient rose from 0.32 in 1990 to
0.43 in 2010 (https://data.worldbank.org). The World Bank’s estimates are lower than most
others, including the Chinese government’s own, which indicate that the Gini coefficient
peaked at 0.49 around 2008 before falling slightly in the last decade (see, for example, Li and
Sicular, 2014). Gao et al. (2019), based on survey data, see income inequalities continuing
to rise significantly between 2007 and 2013.
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CHINA’S SOCIAL POLICY REFORMS: THE SEGMENTED EXTENSION OF
PROVISION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
The Historical Context of Social Policy under State Planning (1949–early 1980s)
The Chinese Party-state was influenced by the Soviet Union’s model of eco-
nomic planning, political organization and social policies after 1949, when
the Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China.
But China in the 1950s and 1960s was very different from the Soviet Union,
with a much bigger population and a much larger proportion working in
agriculture. In social policy terms, therefore, the Soviet model was more in-
fluential in the cities — home to only 12 per cent of the Chinese population
in 1949 — than in the countryside.7 The new regime introduced household
registration that tied people to their place of birth and limited geographical
mobility, creating a strict urban–rural segregation. Urban dwellers benefited
from the so-called ‘IronRiceBowl’: job security andworkplace-provided so-
cial provisions ranging from housing and pensions to healthcare and nursery
or school provision. Although records are poor, we know that this provision
was far from equally allocated — being much more generous for those in
large state enterprises than those in local government-run collectives — but
the result was a high level of equality in income terms. Although men were
more likely to be employed in state enterprises, and women in collectives,
families more often lived in the husband’s allocated housing, and enterprise
employee healthcare also included half of dependants’ costs (Dillon, 2015;
Dixon, 1981).
Once rural communes were set up across China from the late 1950s (until
they were dismantled in the early 1980s), following the collectivization of
land, rural dwellers were also given some much more limited social pro-
tection. This usually consisted of support for those unable to work, primary
school education, and some basic healthcare, often delivered by ‘barefoot
doctors’ and funded through patchily organized and meagrely funded ‘rural
cooperative medical schemes’. But rural dwellers built their own housing
and, without pensions, were dependent on families in their old age (Dillon,
2015; Dixon, 1981).
Market-oriented Economic Reforms and Eroding Social Provisions (1980s and
1990s)
China’s market-oriented economic reforms are conventionally dated to late
1978, when Deng Xiaoping assumed power. Under Deng, China moved
quickly from commune to household farming, and when this stimulated rural
growth, it initiated industrial reforms. State enterprises were permitted to lay
7. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, available at: www.data.stats.gov.cn
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off workers, eroding job security and gradually introducing labour markets.
The spread of commodity markets created rapid growth in the early 1990s,
generating support for pro-market policies and virtually eradicating earlier
opposition to reform. State enterprise reforms in the late 1990s then led to
large-scale lay-offs and the end of the Iron Rice Bowl. Informal sector em-
ployment rose dramatically (Duckett and Hussain, 2008); it is now estimated
that over half of urban workers fall into this category (Jiang et al., 2018).8
Although the state continued to play a role in directing economic investment,
it shifted from issuing detailed plans to deploying macroeconomic levers in
a process that has been described as ‘growing out of the plan’ (Naughton,
1995). It was at this stage that policies became more neoliberal-looking as
Chinese policy makers became so enamoured of markets that they were ad-
vocated even in the health sector, where private hospitals were encouraged,
and in 2001 entrepreneurs were permitted to join the CCP (Holbig, 2013).
The Party-state also adopted pro-market policies in areas of social provi-
sioning, with social policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s partially commer-
cializing healthcare, education and urban housing. Rural cooperative medi-
cal schemes were allowed to collapse in the early 1980s until they operated
in only around 5 per cent of villages (Duckett, 2011) and ‘barefoot doctors’
began to operate as private providers (and were now called ‘village doctors’)
charging fees for services in many areas. Hospitals relied increasingly on pa-
tients’ out-of-pocket payments as workplaces struggled to provide for their
employees’ healthcare. Government spending as a share of hospital budgets
plummeted. In education, although the government did introduce a law on
free nine-year compulsory education in 1986, it was not strictly enforced, and
many state schools began charging fees (Tang et al., 2019). Subsequently,
private schools were allowed to operate, and universities introduced tuition
fees. Similarly, the rapid commoditization of urban housing in the 1990s
meant that, particularly in large cities, housing became unaffordable for
many as prices rose steeply (Lee and Zhu, 2006; Zhu, 2018).
The neoliberal-looking economic policies of the 1990s were accompanied
by social policies aimed at facilitating state enterprise reforms and providing
minimal assistance to the millions of workers who lost their jobs as a result.
Unemployment insurance had been introduced for state sector workers in the
late 1980s as labour markets began to be introduced. In the late 1990s, as the
lay-offs surged, this scheme was supplemented with a myriad of measures
aimed at providing some kind of support. These included the creation of
‘re-employment service centres’ that provided some income support or tried
to provide training or employment services (Duckett and Hussain, 2008).
8. Using the ILO definition of the informal sector, Jiang et al. (2018) argue that those employed
in the informal sector (small private firms or self-employed) probably account for around
50–60 per cent of the total (with significant variation across cities), and that those employed
informally in the formal sector (in other words without a labour contract) have been found
to account for around 11–13 per cent of the total.
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In 1999, the new minimum livelihood guarantee (MLG) programme was
also introduced in the cities. MLG, a cash transfer supplement aimed at
bringing household incomes up to a minimum level (determined locally),
was supposed to ensure a very basic level of household income. Introduced
to reduce protests by workers laid off during state enterprise reforms, it was
subsidized by central government at the turn of the 21st century, and spending
peaked at that time. But eligibility criteria were subsequently tightened and,
as noted in the introduction, in practice MLG was given only to people on
low incomes deemed unable to work, such as the sick, disabled or elderly
(Hammond, 2019; Solinger, 1999). The government also adopted policies
to provide social or low-cost housing for people on low incomes, but they
were poorly implemented (Zhu, 2018).
Urban employee social insurance programmes were also introduced at
this time for old age and health as a way of reducing the burden of pro-
vision on older state enterprises and enabling them to compete on a level
playing field with newer state or private sector businesses. While generous
non-contributory schemes were retained for those working in government,
enterprise schemes involved employees and employers contributing to local
government-administered funds from which pensions and healthcare costs
would be paid. Theywere generous for those who participated, but local gov-
ernments administered the funds and focused particularly on compliance
among state and foreign-invested enterprises or larger private businesses,
with the result that the rising number of informal sector workers and rural-
to-urban migrants did not usually participate (Jiang et al., 2018). Thus, the
proportion of the population participating, for example, in urban employee
health insurance by the turn of the 21st century was much lower than the pro-
portion that had been included in the pre-reform workplace system. Despite
reform, therefore, these programmes were in fact highly regressive because
they were most likely to be provided to professionals, middle management
andworkers with formal labour contracts— those already on higher incomes
(Duckett, 2004).
21st Century Social Policy Reform: Expanding both Urban and Rural Basic
Provision
The result of this combination of economic and social policies was a rise
in average living standards but at the same time a rapid rise in income
inequalities and insecurity, particularly in rural areas and among those in
the cities unable to find work. In the early 21st century, after China joined
the WTO (in 2001) and the economy — and state revenues — continued to
grow, the Chinese Party-state initiated a series of social policy reforms aimed
at delivering some basic social provisions for rural dwellers and urbanites
withoutwork and increased government social spending. From2007 to 2018,
the share of total government spending on education rose from 14.4 per cent
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to 14.6 per cent, on social security and employment support from 10.9 per
cent to 12.2 per cent, and on health from 4 per cent to 7.1 per cent.9
Under the influence of international organizations, the Party-state seems
to have promoted these social policy reforms because it was persuaded
that they would both help develop the economy and prevent dissatisfac-
tion and protest (Duckett, 2019). Measures included abolishing unpopular
agricultural taxes (Wang, 2019), extending ‘new rural cooperative medical
schemes’ (involving both household and government contributions) nation-
wide, and introducing ‘new rural social pensions’. The Party-state extended
MLG to rural areas in 2002 and from 2007 set up a new urban residents’
health insurance for those people ineligible for government or urban em-
ployee health insurance. In recognition of the gradual erosion of free school
education, the Party-state in 2006 also made a commitment to providing
nine years of free education for all in what is sometimes called the ‘Free
Compulsory Education Reform’ of that year (Tang et al., 2019). Recent
policies have begun to merge the urban residents’ and rural cooperative
medical schemes in many localities, as well as sometimes making some pro-
visions portable. The urban–rural divide in social policy is gradually being
eroded.
THE DARK SIDES: AUTHORITARIANISM, NEOLIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS TO SOCIAL POLICY REFORM
China’s social policy reforms established entitlements in principle to old-
age and health insurance for all China’s rural dwellers, and they extended
the Party-state’s commitment to funding ‘basic’ provision for the whole
population. These policies have been portrayed as universalizing and equal-
izing (jundenghua), but with ‘basic’ as yet undefined, they give an im-
pression of universality, while allowing higher levels of care and provision
for better-off urban dwellers in formal work. By retaining (and only in
2015 reforming) generous provision for government officials, then intro-
ducing separate schemes involving employer and employee contributions,
and subsequently adding further, meagre, government-funded schemes for
those ‘residents’ without work, these politically expedient policies cre-
ated a segmented system resulting in very unequal provision. Govern-
ment spending remains relatively low for an upper-middle income country
and skewed towards providing for public servants and urban formal sector
workers.
In relation to pensions, for example, there are several distinct pen-
sions programmes (Zhu and Walker, 2018): long-standing government pen-
sions (paid to officials); urban employee old-age insurance (for those in
9. Calculated by the author using data from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, available
at: www.data.stats.gov.cn
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non-government formal sector work); new rural and urban residents’ social
pensions (formerly separate schemes but merged in 2014); as well as some
residual provision of a former rural pension scheme from 1992; a scheme
for rural dwellers as compensation for their land being bought by local gov-
ernments; and a very minimal ‘Advanced Age Allowance’ for people over
the age of 80 years. Zhu and Walker (2018: 1417) report that these schemes
vary enormously in terms of their provisions, with the government scheme
providing an average 2,500 yuan per month, the employees’ scheme 1,800
yuan, and the residents’ schemes less than a tenth of that, at 127 yuan per
month — so that the Gini coefficient for pensions was 0.68. The inequal-
ities within schemes are also significant, especially within the residents’
scheme.
A broadly similar situation exists for health insurance, where government
officials and formal sector employees receive more generous provisions than
other urban and rural residents. For the latter, co-payments are higher, mean-
ing more direct, out-of-pocket payments. Liu et al. (2016) calculated that as
a result, between 1993 and 2006, 40 per cent of government health spending
went to 3 per cent of the population, and that while the percentage had fallen
recently (following the introduction of the new rural cooperative medical
schemes), in 2012 it was still 25 per cent of spending. Brixi et al. (2013)
found that average per capita government health spending on government
employees was 2,629 yuan, compared to 78 yuan for rural residents and 40
yuan for urban residents. Medical care costs, particularly for serious and
chronic illnesses can push many into poverty. Si et al. (2019) found, for
example, that in 2013 in urban areas in Shanxi province, 47 per cent of
families affected by hypertension and other illnesses suffered ‘catastrophic
health expenses’, with poor families being more vulnerable. This was an
increase on the 22 per cent of families found to have suffered in the same
way in 2008.
Uneven provision in social policies also hides the fact that even in urban
areas, labour market insecurity has been accompanied by social insurance
policies that provide most generously for the better off and most secure.
Because social insurance schemes link benefits to contributions, those with
higher incomes receive more generous benefits (Zhu and Walker, 2018).
Meanwhile, according to a survey conducted in 2012, while 95 per cent of
formal sector workers had health insurance and 90 per cent were enrolled
in a pensions programme, the equivalent figures for informal sector workers
were just 58 per cent and 47 per cent (Jiang et al., 2018: 346). This is why,
even though recent policies have encouraged the inclusion of registered rural
migrants in urban insurance schemes, they are less likely to be enrolled —
because they are less likely than urban registered residents to have formal
employment (ibid.: 348).
Similarly, although labour markets brought insecurity, unemployment in-
surance provided for only a small share of the working population, and
often the better off and most secure among the population. Unemployment
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insurance, like old-age and health insurance, is contributory, is available
only to urban waged workers, and is more likely among those in formal
work (Duckett and Hussain, 2008). Gao et al. (2019) found it to have a
negligible effect on intra-urban income inequalities.
Education reforms in the 21st century have seen an expansion in provision
and an increase in education quality in many areas, but the education system
has become more unequal as a result, with regional as well as class differ-
ences in access to quality education (Schulte, 2018). Although the 2006
education reform sought to exempt rural school children from tuition and
other miscellaneous school fees (following efforts to limit fees in rural areas
in 2001–04), it did not tackle the problem of unequal quality in education
provision due to differential local government investment, or the problems
that the urban poor face in sending their children to school, for instance
because they cannot afford all the additional costs (stationery, books, and so
on).
Policies to improve the supply of affordable and adequate housing have
also proved difficult to implement. Recent efforts have included shared-
homeownership schemes, build-to-rent schemes and shanty-town upgrading.
As Zhu Yapeng has noted, the provision of public social housing in China
— following a general trend away from social rental housing across many
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
— is not a priority, and ‘[t]he use of subsidies instead of direct provisioning
shows that the Chinese government prefers market-based solutions [to the
supply of housing] . . . as it also helps to stimulate the economy’ (Zhu,
2018: 48). The consequence so far is that (as of 2015) as many as 60 per
cent of Chinese households in China’s largest cities (cities with a population
of over 7 million) could not afford to buy or rent housing without a subsidy
(Woetzel, 2015). As a result, many — especially migrants from rural areas
— live in shanty towns on the outskirts of cities and lack basic facilities such
as running water, electricity and heating.
A different set of downsides is produced by China’s means-tested MLG
programmes introduced in the 1990s in the cities and in the first decade of
the 21st century in the countryside. These programmes provide cash support
to households falling below a locally determined minimum level that is
calculated using the price of a basket of essential items. Cash transfers
bring households up to the local level and are agreed to be meagre —
barely sufficient to provide food and some basic clothing. Dorothy Solinger
(2017) has calculated that in the cities between 2006 and 2015 they brought
incomes to around 16–17 per cent of average disposable income (down from
21 per cent in 2003). Even then, the scheme is in practice implemented
much more stringently than policy documents suggest, so that fewer than
half of those with incomes below the local MLG line were receiving the
benefit (ibid.: 51). The scheme is also highly stigmatizing since it is targeted
at only the very poorest and involves the MLG applicants’ circumstances
being publicly displayed in the neighbourhood (Hammond, 2019; Solinger,
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1999). The MLG schemes expanded in terms of coverage between 1999
and 2011 — rising from 2.8 million participants to 76 million in that period
— but the number of participants fell steadily thereafter to 45.3 million in
2018.10 Total spending on this programme, which had risen from 0.1 per
cent of government expenditures in 1999 to 1.2 per cent in 2013, fell in 2014
(Solinger, 2017). Spending as a share of GDP rose from 0.02 per cent in
1999 to a high of 0.14 per cent in 2009, falling to 0.11 per cent in 2014 —
low in comparison with Latin America, Mexico and Indonesia at around the
same period, as Solinger (ibid.: 50–51) points out.
Given the very different levels of provision across different schemes and
localities, it is unsurprising that their 21st century roll-out has done little
to reduce inequalities. Gao et al. (2019), analysing household and individ-
ual income data from 2002, 2007 and 2013, found social benefits (defined
to include pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, MLG and
housing, as well as in-kind benefits) contributed a much higher proportion of
urban than rural household incomes (18 per cent versus 6 per cent, in 2013).
Within (but not between) urban and rural areas, pensions did help reduce
inequalities somewhat, but other benefits had negligible effects. MLG low-
ered the urban Gini coefficient by 0.002 in 2013, but urban residents’ health
insurance had no observable effect. Overall, post-transfer income inequali-
ties were higher in 2013 than in 2002 because pre-transfer income inequality
(incomes before taking into account social benefits) increased significantly
during that time.
Social policies havemeanwhile had limited effects in reducing inequalities
between regions, betweenmigrants and urban residents, and betweenwomen
andmen. Regional disparities—particularly between large coastal cities and
the rural hinterland — remain stark. Migrants are still much less likely to
benefit from social provisions than either urban or rural residents (Gao et al.,
2013; Gao et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2016). Much less often researched and
discussed, but just as significant and serious, are the gender inequalities.
Shen et al. (2016: 76) found that patterns of inequalities in transfers for
public healthcare and pensions were ‘remarkably biased against women’,
while Zhu and Walker (2018: 1419) found that women’s pensions were on
average 30 per cent lower than those of men.
Overall, then, the Chinese Party-state’s social policies reinforced or com-
pounded inequalities and segmented the population, while their marketizing
components also created their own insecurities. At the same time, they
facilitated pro-market economic politics by reducing opposition to mar-
ket insecurities. This approach avoided politically difficult redistributions
(reducing government expenditures on public servants and urban middle
classes, for example, in order to increase spending on poor farmers) or sub-
stantially raising government expenditures, and it enabled the CCP to retain
10. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, available at: www.data.stats.gov.cn
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urban support while reducing dissatisfaction among previously neglected,
left-behind segments of the population.11
CONCLUSION: COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND STATE CAPITALISM
Of course, the Party-state faces many difficulties when trying to tackle
social problems. It must manage the challenges of dismantling state planning
during the demographic transition to an ageing population and the health
transition to a society with a greater burden of chronic rather than contagious
diseases (Gao et al., 2019). At the same time, it faces the problem of ensuring
policies are implemented and preventing funds being siphoned away from
public spending by corrupt officials across its vast territory and five levels
of government administration.
These problems and the dark sides of social policy in China undermine
the case for China as a straightforward model for other developing coun-
tries. China may be one of the few low-income countries for which market
liberalization has led to sustained high levels of growth, and it may have
successfully reduced extreme poverty. But China’s Gini coefficient is ex-
tremely high and over a quarter of the population still live on less than
US$ 5.50 a day — the definition of poverty for an upper-middle income
country like China. While this might seem preferable to the dire poverty and
lack of progress in some of the world’s poorest nations, policy makers in
developing countries would do well to consider the high levels of inequal-
ity, insecurity and segregation that have accompanied growth in China and
whether they could do better than adopt a similarly neoliberal approach to
development.
Where then does China fit in the post-1980s neoliberal era of new right
and populist politics? China’s neoliberal-looking economic policies, and the
social policies that have facilitated and supported them, resemble the policies
of right-wing parties elsewhere in the world, who tend to favour ‘conserva-
tive’ welfare regimes that similarly segment provision to protect the benefits
of the elite.12 But this does not necessarily make the Chinese Party-state
an ally of the right-wing elsewhere. First, the ruling Chinese Communist
Party in formal terms espouses ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ —
something that enables it to retain the appearance of ideological continuity
11. There is some evidence, based on social survey research in China, that social policies — or
hearing about them — can increase support for the Party-state; see for example Lu¨ (2014).
Moreover, neoliberal policies in China receive some support from the urban elite because
this segment of the population has benefited the most. But those policies are also supported
because they have helped reduce state power in economic enterprises and in society —
remembering that China’s neoliberal-looking policies were introduced after more than two
decades of state economic planning and almost totalitarian political control (Tsou, 1986).
12. For example, Japan and many countries of Latin America. For a thorough analysis of
segmentation in Latin America, see Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea (2018).
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(‘socialism’) without many of its policy constraints. The precise formulation
the CCP adopted in the late 1980s was that it was guiding China through
the ‘primary stage of socialism’ (referring back to Marxist theory) and in
so doing, merely mimicking capitalism while in fact developing a ‘social-
ist market economy’.13 This enables Party-state decision makers to openly
embrace markets and market efficiency in the name of socialism.14 At the
same time, the CCP’s grip on power has meant that instead of new parties of
the right (or left) emerging to challenge its policies, right–left debates have
taken place within the CCP. In this way, China’s authoritarian politics have
seen ‘right-wing’, neoliberal-looking economic and social policies emerge
in a ‘communist’ or ‘socialist’ system, and then be challenged by an intra-
Party New Left. But China’s right-wing policies are not best termed ‘New
Right’, because they are neither straightforwardly economically liberal nor
socially conservative — at least not openly within the CCP (Pan and Xu,
2018; Zhang, 2019).15
The politics that shape social policies in China are also different from
right-wing ‘populism’ in many other parts of the world. Although 21st cen-
tury social policies have focused on new programmes for the large number
of rural dwellers who had been hitherto neglected, the CCP is not appealing
to mass support in order to win elections as have most other populist leaders
and parties in recent years. Nor are its policies presented, as in conven-
tional definitions of populism, as pitting ordinary people against a corrupt
elite. Furthermore, while China’s current top leader, Xi Jinping, has some-
times been labelled as a populist due to his nationalism and hard-hitting
anti-corruption campaign (Babones, 2017; Perry, 2015; Tang, 2016; Zhang,
2019), most of the social policies discussed in this article were introduced
before Xi became the CCP’s top leader in 2012.
Instead, authoritarian politics are central to understanding both China’s
neoliberal-looking economic reforms and its social policies. Deng Xiaoping
introduced economic reforms in order to shore up support for the CCP after
the damaging ultra-leftism of the 1960s and 1970s. From the late 1990s,
the CCP then used social policies in response to criticisms of the resulting
social problems and inequalities (said by some critics to be inappropriate
under a communist party) as well as to further economic growth, reduce
political dissatisfaction and pre-empt protest. Thus, social policies have
been used to help build and retain support for continued CCP rule. But they
have been facilitated by the array of media and social controls the CCP has
developed over its 70 years in government. The People’s Republic of China
13. For a useful discussion of ideological evolution in China, see Holbig (2013).
14. Markets were controversial and contested among some in the Party in the 1980s, but
opposition to them waned from the early 1990s.
15. Although the CCP is in some ways socially conservative — in relation to feminism and
homosexuality, for example — its conservatism is not underpinned by religion and it has
moved in small ways in a liberal direction.
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therefore shows how adaptive authoritarian regimes can be influenced by
global ideas and policy trends, as well as how they may very effectively
and substantially shift both their ideology and policies in order to maintain
power.
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